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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PATRICIA MUNOZ-MADRID,
Petitioner/ Appellee,
vs.

Case Number: 20161013

MARTIN ROBERTO CARLOS-MORAN,
Respondent/Appellant.

~

BRIEF OF APPELLEE PATRICIA MUNOZ-MADRID

JURISDICTION

The Appellant challenges the alimony award contained in the Fourth
vib

District Court's Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered on November 10, 2016. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(h).
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony .. and
~

[determinations of alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Vanderzon v. Vanderzon, 2017 UT App
150, §41, citing Jensen v. Jensen, 2018 UT App 392, ,r5, 197 P .3d 117 (alteration
and omission in original)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1.

Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 345 P.3d 566 (Utah 2015)

2.

Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah App. 2008)

3.

Sauer v. Sauer, 2017 UT App 114 (Attached as Addendum "8.")

4.

Vanderzon v. Vanderzon, 2017 UT App 150

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h)

STATEMENT OF CASE/FACTS
Petitioner/Appellee, Patricia Munoz-Madrid (hereinafter "wife") and
Respondent/Appellant, Martin Roberto Carlos-Moran (hereinafter "husband")
were married for 19 years at the time of Decree of Divorce (R. 709). The wife
filed for divorce on May 20, 2014 and requested sole custody of the parties' minor
children. The Father filed a Counterclaim and also requested sole custody of the
parties' minor children (R. 710).
A Decree of Divorce (hereinafter "Decree") (R. 730-737) was entered on
November 10, 2016 in which the wife and husband were awarded joint legal and
joint physical custody of the two remaining minor children with on an alternating
week bases (R. 731 ). All personal and real property (except for the retirements)
were equally divided between the wife and husband (R. 734-736).
The Decree provides that wife's gross income is $2,005 per month with a
net income of $1,600.00 per month, and that husband's gross income is
2
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$4,281.00 per month with a net income of $3,831.00 per month (R. 727). Wife
was awarded child support of $252.00 per month and alimony of $548.00 per
IJ

month for a period of twelve years (R. 731, 734 ).
Relevant Alimony Court Proceedings. Upon the wife's filing of the Petition
for Divorce she filed a Motion to Waive Fees as well an Affidavit (R. 15-22). On
July 23, 2014, the Court entered an Order to Pay Filing Fees in which the wife
was ordered to either pay the filing fees or file the appropriate documents or the
case would be dismissed (R. at 42). On July 30, 2014, the wife filed her Financial
Declaration and on July 31, 2014, the Court entered an Order on Motion to Waive
Fees wherein the wife's filing fees were waived (R. 45-56, 59-60).
At the time wife filed her July 30, 2014 Financial Declaration, she was still
residing in the marital residence with her husband. This Financial Declaration
lists her monthly expenses at $1,833.00 with no claimed expenses for rent,
mortgage, automobile insurance, electricity, gas, water or television (R. 53-54,
and R. 1167 at Ex. #15)
On September 3, 2014, husband filed a Motion for Temporary Orders (R.
71-74). He also filed a Financial Declaration (dated 06/18/14) in which he lists his

~

monthly expenses at $2,940.00 (R.64-69).
On September 11, 2014, wife filed an updated Financial Declaration which
-;J

lists her monthly expenses at $3,307.00 and lists expenses for mortgage/rent,
3
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automobile insurance, electricity, gas and water that were not claimed in her prior
Financial Declaration dated July 30, 2014. (R. 154-174 and R. 1167 at Ex. #16)
On September 17, 2014, husband obtained an ExParte Temporary
Protective Order which required the wife to leave the marital residence ( See
Fourth District Court Case # 144402170).
On September 21, 2014 wife filed an Amended Financial Declaration
(dated 09/19/14) in which she increases her monthly expenses and lists them at
$3,531.00 (R. 189-200, and R. 1167 at Ex. 17).
On September 29, 2014, both the Exparte Protective Order and the
divorce Temporary Hearing were heard. At this hearing, a Protective Order was
entered against the wife which has subsequently been dismissed ( See
Temporary Protective Order in Fourth District Court Case# 144402170). On this
same day, temporary orders were issued and husband was awarded temporary
custody and temporary possession of the marital residence. Husband was
awarded temporary child support in the amount of $481.00 per month. Wife's
request for temporary alimony was reserved with an order allowing her to bring
the issue back before the Court once she updated her Financial Declaration with
amended expenses taking into account that husband had been awarded
temporary custody and temporary possession of the marital residence (R. 215219).
4
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On November 28, 2014, in order to obtain a temporary alimony award, wife
filed another Financial Declaration along with her check stub showing her gross
~

monthly earnings were $1,962.00 and her net monthly income net monthly
income was $1,670.00 (R. 229-240 and R. 1167 at Ex. #18). At this time, wife
'

was living with a coworker who was gracious and allowing her to stay rent free
until she could get a place of her own. Wife had been looking for two to three
bedroom homes in the Orem/Provo area and they were ranging from $750 to
~

$1,300 (R. at 224-226). Consequently, in this Financial Declaration, the wife had
to estimate her anticipated rent and utilities at what she expected to pay once she
got her own apartment. Based upon these estimated expenses, the wife lists her
monthly expenses at $3,262.00 (R. 229-240 and R. 1167 at Ex. #18 ).
A temporary alimony hearing was held before Commissioner Thomas R.
Patton on December 16, 2014, and effective October 2014, the wife was awarded
temporary alimony in the amount of $758.00 per month, and after deducting her
monthly child support obligation of $481.00, wife was awarded net temporary
alimony of $277.00 per month (R 369-372). Wife filed an Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation on December 30, 2014 in which she objected
to her temporary alimony award (R 243-256).
Husband failed to pay absolutely any alimony or any of his portion of the
children's medical insurance premiums, and so an Order to Show Cause was
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

scheduled to be heard before Commissioner Patton on September 9, 2015 (R.
394-398, 711 ). On August 30, 2015 Uust 9 days before the OSC), the husband
paid wife $3,393.00 which brought him current up through July 31, 2015 on his
alimony and medical insurance obligations (R. 394-398, 712).
On September 9, 2015, the parties were also before Judge Fred D. Howard
on wife's objection to her alimony. award. The Court sustained the wife's
objection and held that effective October 2014, her temporary alimony award
would be increased to $1,181.00 per month and with her $481.00 temporary child
support obligation, it would result in net temporary alimony of $700.00 per month

(R. 386-388, 712).
In anticipation of the trial scheduled on January 6 and 8, 2016, both parties
updated their Financial Declarations. Introduced at trial was wife's Financial
Declaration dated December 7, 2015 in which she lists her monthly expenses at
$3,475.00 (R. 1167 at Ex. #5). Also, introduced at trial was husband's Amended
Financial Declaration dated December 15, 2015 in which he lists his monthly
expenses at $3,543.00 (R. 1167 at Ex. #22).
Throughout the pendency of the divorce proceedings, the Financial
Declarations filed by the parties with their verified expenses are as follows:

6
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Wife's Financial Declarations
Dated
07/30/14
09/11/14
09/19/14
11 /24/14
12/17/15

$1,833.00
$3,307.00
$3,532.00
$3,262.00
$3,475.00

Monthly Expenses
Monthly Expenses
Monthly Expenses
Monthly Expenses
Monthly Expenses

(R. 45-56; R. 1167 at Ex.15)
(R.165-174; R. 1167 at Ex.16)
(R. 189-200; R. 1167 at Ex. 17)
(R. 229-240; R. 1167 at Ex.18)
(R. 1167 at Ex.# 5)

Husband's Financial Declarations
Dated
06/18/2014 $2,940.00 Monthly Expenses (R. 64-69)
12/07/2015 $3,543.00 Monthly Expenses (R. 1167 at Ex. #22)

From the date of the parties' separation in September 2014 until the trial in
January 2016, the wife was living with her coworker because wife could not afford
a place of her own (Tr. 01/06/12@15:12-23; 16:1-21).
This coworker , Emma Polger, testified wife had paid her $300 or $350 per
month since August 2015 (Tr. 01 /06/12 @25: 1-5). Ms. Polger further testified that
she had an agreement with wife that beginning in September 2015 that wife
would start paying her $800.00 per month as rent but that wife had been unable
to do so (Tr. 01/06/12 @16:22-25; 17:1-23). She further testified that she was
planning on retiring soon and moving to Mexico and that wife was going to stay in
her home and pay Ms. Polger $800 per month as well as all pay all the household
utilities. She also testified she could no longer afford to subsidize the wife (Tr.
01/06/12 @17:13-23; 18:1-22; 19:1-8).
At trial, counsel stipulated that wife's testimony would be that her current

7
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needs were consistent with the stated expenses as provided in her Financial
Declaration with a few modifications and so wife did not testify as to each and
every expense (Tr. 01/06/12 @74:23-25; 75:1-8; 76:10-13). However, wife did
testify that on her December 17, 2015 Financial Declaration that her listed
monthly living expenses of $3,474.94 should be reduced by $50.00 since her rent
was incorrectly listed as $850.00 and it should have been $800.00 (Tr. 01/06/12
@76: 18-25). Wife further testified that the listed utility expenses on this Financial
Declaration for electric, gas and water were taken from receipts from Ms. Polger's
home where she was living (Tr. 01/06/12 @111 :18-24).
After the conclusion of the two day trial, both wife and husband filed Post
Trial Briefs with addendum and exhibits. (R. 526-576, 577-638). In support of
wife's position for alimony, she filed an addendum outlining wife's demonstrative
summary of needs which outlined wife's monthly needs at $3,425.00 per month
(which had been reduced $50.00 due to overstatement on rent) and a request for
net proceeds from husband in the amount of $900.00. A copy of said
Demonstrative Summary of Needs is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and
incorporated herein by this reference (R. 575-576).
As to the alimony issue, the Findings provide that irregardless of husband's
arguments regarding wife's proof of expenses, "[T]he court finds the mother's
(wife's) expenses of $3,200.00 per month, deducting some stated expenses for

8
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"'

credit cards, her 401 k contribution, but otherwise accepting her expenses from
her financial declaration in the summary of her post-trial brief (R. 737 and See

~

Addendum "A" for summary). Therefore, based upon the wife's Demonstrative
Summary of Needs in which wife's expenses were $3,425.00, the court took
deductions from wife's stated credit card payments and 401 K deposit and
determined that she had n~eds of $3,200.00 per month.
Unequal Division of Retirement Accounts. Pursuant to the Findings, wife's

~

401 K account as of September 30, 2015 was $62,359.00. Whereas, the
husband's 401 K account as of September 30, 2015 was $117,579.00. Each

v;;

party was awarded their respective 401 K accounts with the husband receiving
$55,220.00 more than the wife [$117,579 - $62,359 = $55,220] (R. 720, 735).
The Court held that since the parties checked a box on their Mexico marriage
certificate/license electing to keep all their property rights separate and non
marital, that even though the retirements were acquired during the parties'

~

marriage and the parties' had commingled all their funds throughout their
marriage, the retirement accounts were treated as separate property (R. 733736, See also marriage certificate license found at R. 1136 at Ex. # 1 ). It should

l;J

be noted that this is not relevant to the pending alimony appeal, but is referenced
only to demonstrate that the husband was awarded significantly more than the
wife.
9
li:J
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
After a nineteen year marriage, AppellanUhusband was ordered to pay
Appellee/wife alimony. Husband argues the trial court erred in awarding alimony
because the wife failed to provide proof of her current expenses or supporting
documentation. Wife disagrees and asserts that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion since there was sufficient credible evidence of wife's needs and even if
there was not sufficient credible evidence, trial courts are allowed to impute
reasonable expenses in determining alimony factors.

ij;.,

The entire crux of husband's argument is that wife was required to provide
the court with "supporting documentation or to otherwise verify or prove her
financial needs." At trial, counsel stipulated that wife's testimony would be that
her current needs were consistent with the stated expenses as provided in her
Financial Declaration. Consequently, there was testimony as to wife's current
expenses, a Financial Declaration, and supporting documentation as to a few of
her expenses. Based upon testimony, evidence, and court pleadings on file, the
trial court determined there was sufficient credible evidence and that wife had
needs and awarded alimony. The fact that husband argues that wife did not
submit enough documentation does constitute an abuse of discretion since it is
for the trier of fact to determine sufficiency of credible evidence.
Husband further argues that wife has no needs because if her

10
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~

"unsupported expenses" are subtracted from her stated expenses in her Financial
Declaration then she has sufficient income to cover her own expenses. However,
~

husband fails to even acknowledge that trial courts are allowed to impute
reasonable expenses when there is insufficient evidence of alimony factors.
Consequently, in this matter, even if there was not enough credible evidence of
wife's needs, the trial court has discretion to impute reasonable expenses of
wife's needs and so the trial court's determination of wife's needs was proper.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded wife
alimony since there was sufficient credible evidence of wife's needs and even if

VJ

there was not sufficient credible evidence, the trial court has discretion to impute
reasonable expenses. The alimony award should be upheld and wife should be
awarded attorney fees and costs associated with this appeal.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
AWARDED WIFE ALIMONY SINCE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF WIFE'S NEEDS.

A.

The Trial Court's Findings Are Not Erroneous and Should be
Upheld Since There Was Sufficient Credible Evidence to Find
That Wife's Needs Were $3,200.00 Per Month.

In this appeal, we have divorced parents of two minor children who were
married for nineteen years. The parties were awarded joint legal and joint
physical custody of the minor children on an alternating week schedule. Wife has
11
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been employed by the State of Utah for over sixteen years and has gross
earnings of $2,005.00 per month with a net income of $1,600.00 per month.
Husband has gross earnings of $4,281.00 per month with a net income of
$3,831.00 per month (R. 727). The wife was awarded child support in the
amount of $252.00 per month and alimony of $548.00 per month for a period of
twelve years (R. at 731, 734).
Husband argues that wife failed to provide the trial court with "sufficient
credible evidence"to establish need, one of the required elements of alimony,

and as such the trial court should not have awarded any alimony. The crux of
husband's argument is that over a period of sixteen months while the divorce was
pending, the wife filed five different financial declarations and that her expenses
were a "moving target." Husband further reasons, that at trial, wife submitted a
financial declaration, Am Ex statement, paystub with 401 K loan, and an
automobile contract, and that these items did not rise to the level of "sufficient
credible evidence" and so there was no basis for the trial court to determine she
had any financial needs. (See Brief of Appellant at pgs 13-15)
"Credible Evidence" is defined as follows: "Evidence that is worthy of belief;
trustworthy evidence. " Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004 ). The Utah Court of
Appeals recently addressed the issue of credibility and held as follows:

12
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[W]e give great deference to a trial court's determinations of
credibility "based on the presumption that the trial judge, having
personally observed the quality of evidence, the tenor of the
proceeding, and the demeanor of the parties, is in a better position to
perceive the subtleties at issue that we can looking only at the cold
record."
Sauer v. Sauer, 2017 UT App 114 ,r 6, citing State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87 ,r 20,
57 P.3d 220, 225 (Utah 2002).
As to the issue of credibility, the Sauer decision further held:
Consequently, in "all actions tried upon the facts without a jury,
findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses."

Sauer at 2017 UT App 114116, citing Hale v. Big H Constr. Inc., 2012 UT App
283, 1J9, 288 P.3d 1046 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (2012))(brackets, ellipses,
and internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, there were valid reasons why wife filed five Financial
..J

Declarations during the pendency of the proceedings. Upon examination of the
Financial Declaration summary above, it demonstrates that except for wife's July
30, 2014 Declaration which was filed to obtain a court fee waiver, the remaining
four declarations are within $270.00 of each other and husband's two Financial
Declarations are within $603.00 of each other. [$3,532 - $3,262 = $270][$3,542 $2,940 = $602]. Wife's Financial Declarations definitely were not moving targets
13
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as alleged by husband.
After a two day trial, the trial court heard testimony, examined evidence
and pleadings, and held that wife had expenses of $3,200 per month which is
fairly consistent with husband's stated expenses of $3,543.15 in his Financial
Declaration (R. 1167 at Exhibit # 16). It is very hard to establish that the trial
court's ruling of wife's needs at $3,200.00 are "erroneous" when wife's
determined needs are relatively close to husband's stated needs.
It is absolutely not the husband's job to determine.what evidence is or is
not credible and how much and what type of evidence is required before a court
can determine there is "sufficient credible evidence." It is for the trial court to
determine what constitutes "sufficient credible evidence" and since husband has
failed to demonstrate or even argue that the court's findings as "erroneous", the
alimony award should stand as ordered.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Awarded
Wife Alimony Since Wife Proved Her Financial Need for
Alimony.

In Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, 1J9, 197 P.3d 117, 120 (Utah App.
2008), this Court ruled that trial courts have broad discretion in making alimony
awards so long as they consider the following facts: (I) the financial condition and
needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income; (iii) the ability of the payer spouse to provide support; (iv) the

14
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~

length of the marriage; (v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of the minor
children requiring support. citing Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)
Furthermore the Jensen court held as follows:
In addition, trial courts must be mindful of the primary purposes of
alimony: "(1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same
standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the
standards of living of each party; and (3) to prevent the recipient
spouse from becoming a public charge."

Id. at 119, citing Richardson v. Richardson, 2008 UT 57, 117, 611 Utah Adv. Rep.
12, __ P.3d_. 2008 WL 3835161 (citations omitted).
Also, the Jensen court held that "[where a trial court considers these facts,
vJ

we will disturb its alimony award only if there is " ' a serious inequity ...
manifesting] a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 119, citing Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT

xJ

App 236, 1126, 9 P.3d 171 (quoting Children v. Children, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998)(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding wife
alimony because she did not provide proper verification of her expenses.
Interestingly, the husband cites the Dahl case at 1184 which holds as follows:
We review a district court's alimony determination for abuse of
discretion and "will not disturb [its] ruling on alimony as long as the
court exercises its discretion within the bounds and under the
standards we have set and has supported its decision with adequate
findings and conclusions."

15
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Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, 1184, 345 P.3d 566, 591 (Utah 2015), citing Cornell v.
Cornell, 2010 UT App 139, 115, 233 P.3d 836 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In support of husband's abuse of discretion position, he relies almost
exclusively upon the Dahl case. He argues, that in the instant case, the trial court
abused its discretion since wife had the "burden of providing" the trial court with
"sufficient credible evidence of each factor listed in the Alimony Statute" and that
in husband's opinion she did not do this (Appellant Brief at p. 12) (See also Dahl

at ,I108).

However, as argued above, it is not for the husband to determine if

evidence is credible or not. It is for the trial court to determine when and if
evidence is credible. Husband further argues that this appeal is "strikingly similar

~

to the facts and issues in Dahl." (Appellant Brief at p. 13). However, this
assertion could not be further than the truth. In Dahl, the wife was denied
~

temporary alimony because her financial declaration attesting to $40,000.00 per
month in expenses could not be reconciled with her prior representation to the
court of $11,000.00 per month in expenses. Additionally, at the time of trial, the
wife had not provided the court with a financial declaration and instead the wife
testified as to financial information she had presented to the court two years
earlier and her recollection of her spending habits and her ability to work. The
Dahl trial court held that wife's estimate of expenses from the period of marital
cohabitation rather than providing realistic testimony about her current assets,
16
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needs and expenses, precluded the trial court from considering an award of
permanent alimony. Dahl at 595.
Clearly, the facts in this appeal and the Dahl case are distinguishable.
First, in this case, the trial court used its discretion and found there was credible
evidence and awarded wife alimony. Whereas, in the Dahl case, the trial court
used its discretion and held there was not credible evidence since the wife had
not provided any "realistic testimony about her current assets, needs and
expenses" and so alimony was not awarded.
Secondly, in this case, the wife was awarded equity from the marital
residence in the amount of $44,848.00 less costs of refinance and her own
retirement of $62,359.00 (R. 720, 727-728). Husband in this case was awarded
his retirement in the amount of $117,578.94 which is $55,220.00 more than the
wife's retirement. Husband was also awarded the income tax deductions for the
children (R. 720, 727-728). Whereas, in the Dahl case the wife received
vJ

$1,200,000.00 in a property settlement which the trial court determined was
substantial enough to support a comfortable standard of living. Sauer fn. 2.
Wife has net income for earnings of $1,600.00 per month. When she
receives her monthly alimony of $548.00 and her monthly child support of
$252.00, she has $2,400.00 per month to meet her monthly obligations (R. 727)
[$1,600.00 + $252.00 + $548 = $2,400.00].
17
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Husband has net income of $3,831.00 and when he pays his monthly child
support obligation of $548.00 and his monthly child support obligation of $252.00,
he has $3,031.00 per month to meet his monthly obligations [$3,831.00 -$548.00
- $252.00 = $3,031.00]. Husband also was awarded the income tax deductions
for the minor children which greatly benefits him tax wise (R. 727, 733).
In this case, the trial court after reviewing the evidence and introduction of
testimony, properly determined that wife's needs were $3,200.00 per month and
awarded wife alimony in the amount of $548.00 in an attempt to equalize the
parties' standard of living.
ARGUMENT

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION IN
AWARDING WIFE ALIMONY SINCE COURTS ARE
ALLOWED TO IMPUTE REASONABLE EXPENSES IN
DETERMINING ALIMONY FACTORS.

As outlined above in Argument I, there was sufficient credible evidence for
the trial court to determine wife's monthly needs of $3,200.00 when it considered
the alimony factors and awarded wife alimony of $548.00 per month. However,
in this matter, even if there was not sufficient credible evidence, the trial court is
allowed to impute reasonable expenses for alimony factors.
In Argument II of husband's brief, he alleges that the trial court abused its
discretion when it awarded wife alimony in excess of wife's "verified financial
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needs. In support of this position, husband once again refers to Dahl and argues
a party must "present evidence and supporting documents sufficient to prove their
(Ji

need - something beyond a party's own recollections, such as supporting
documentation or expert testimony" (See Appellant Brief at p. 16 citing Dahl at ,r's
108-109). Husband then goes on to argue that, in his opinion, wife only has
"verified expenses" of $1,195.00 per month and as such the alimony factors
preclude her from being awarded alimony since wife does not have need above
her monthly earnings and child support award (See Appellant Brief at p. 18).
Ironically, the Dahl case, which the husband so heavily relies upon,
specifically provides for the imputation of reasonable expenses when there is no
credible evidence.
In Sauer, the court interprets Dahl and holds as follows:
Dahl instructs that the court may impute a reasonable amount for an
alimony factor when no credible evidence regarding that factor has
been presented. See Dahl, 2015, UT 79, ,r,r 115-16 (noting that
"there [was] insufficient evidence of one of the statutory alimony
facts" due to a party's "failure to provide credible evidence of her
financial need," and thus the trial court could impute figures. When a
party obviously underestimates (as here) or overestimates (as if
more common) his or her living expenses, the trial court is not limited
to awarding either the reported amount or nothing.
In Dahl, the supreme court ultimately held that the district court's
failure to impute an amount for Ms. Dahl's needs was within its
discretion. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 ,r,r 116-17. While the district
court could have imputed an amount, it was not required to do so,
because it "awarded Ms. Dahl over $1.5 million in marital property"
19
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which was "sufficiently large . . . To support a comfortable standard
of living." Id. at 11116.

Sauer at 119 and fn2.
Husband reasons in his brief that many of wife's listed expenses in her
Financial Declaration are not "verified expenses" because she is living with a
coworker and at the time of trial was not actually paying the stated expenses in
her Financial Declaration. However, this issue is also specifically addressed in

Sauer which holds for purposes of determining need for alimony purposes, that
when housing expenses are being subsidized through charity or a member of the
public, it is "appropriate for the court to consider ... reasonable unsubsidized
needs rather than . . actual expenses." Sauer at 1J4.
This ruling is directly on point to the present case because wife, at time of
trial, was living with a gracious coworker and could not pay the agreed upon rent
and utilities because husband was not paying his court ordered alimony and so
wife was forced to rely upon the "charity and good will" of her coworker.
Cll..

Husband's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding alimony
in excess of wife's verified financial needs is in direct conflict with Sauer's
interpretation of Dahl. In this matter, it is evidently clear that the trial court was
within its discretion to adjust the wife's financial declaration and find that wife's
needs were $3,200.00 per month. The wife's alimony award should be up
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upheld.
CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, the wife respectfully requests
this Court affirm the trial court's alimony award. Since this appeal is without
merit, wife should be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this
\[jg

appeal.
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PETITIONER'S DEMONSTRATIVE
SUMMARY OF NEEDS
Patricia's Need:

~

$2,005 Monthly Gross Income
- 378 Taxes ($133.36 Federal Taxes/ $134.49 FICA/ $31.43 Medicare/ $78.41 State Taxes)
$1,627 NET INCOME
-3,425 Expenses from Financial Declaration. See Attached Summary
($1,798) deficit

Martin's Need:
$4,281
+ 167
$4,448
- 617
$3,831
-3,814
$ 17

Salary Income
Bonus Income ($2,000 year historical average)
Monthly Gross Income
Taxes ( $469.11 Federal Taxes/ $148.27 State Taxes)
NET INCOME
Expenses from Financial Declaration. See Attached Summary
Surplus

After child support adjustments are made,
if Patricia is awarded
$900.00 per month NET PROCEEDS from Martin,
then the parties financial situations would be as follows:

Patricia

Martin

$1,627 Net Income
+ 900 Net Proceeds From Martin
$2,527 Net Per Month
-3,425 Expenses
($898) deficit

$3,831 Net Income
- 900 Net Proceeds to Patricia
$2,931 Net Per Month
- 3,831 Expenses
($900) deficit
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DEMONSTRATIVE SUMMARY OF NEEDS
Patricia's Needs
Present
11/28/14
Rent
Mortgage, Prop. Taxes & Insurance
Property Maintenance
Electricity
Gas
Water, Sewer and Garbage
Telephone
Paid Television
Internet
TOTAL HOUSING AND UTILITIES

80.00
80.00
60.00
70.00
68.00
$
40.00
$1 ,198.00

Food and Household Supplies
TOTAL FOOD EXPENSES

$ 600.00

$ 800.00

Clothing
Laundry and Cleaning
TOTAL CLOTHING & LAUNDRY
Entertainment
Donations
Gifts
Cash Withdrawals
Personal Care and Haircuts
TOT AL MISCELLANEOUS

$ 850.00

$ 130.00

$ 736.00
$ 25.00
$ 80.00
$ 80.00
$ 60.00
$ 35.00

$ 218.00
$ 127.00

$ 40.00
$1 ,120.00

$
98.00
$1,114.00

$1 ,226.00

$ 350.00
$ 350.00

$ 747.30
$ 747.30

$ 300.00

$ 265.00
$ 110.00
$ 100.00
$ 50.00

$ 50.00
$ 200.00

$
$

$ 525.00

$
$
$
$
$

$ 600.00

Auto Loan
Auto Insurance
Gas
Auto Maintenance
TOT AL AUTOMOBILE EXPENSES

Martin's Needs
Present
06/18/14

$
$

80.00
60.00

$ 861 .00
$ 20.00

$ 300.00

$ 300.00

71.50
74.63
$
21.35
$ 167.48

$ 274.00

$ 150.00

$ 150.00

$

62.00

$ 180.00

$

35.00
$ 185.00

$ 100.00
$ 250.00

$

62.00

$ 180.00

$ 100.00
$ 45.00
$ 35.00

$ 100.00
$ 45.00
$ 35.00

$

58.00

$ 100.00

$

50.00

$ 274.00

$ 143.00
$

Credit Card Payments
401 K Retirement Loan
Bank and Other Fees
TOTAL CREDIT CARDS,
LOANS & BANK FEES

19.24

$

$ 180.00

$ 180.00

$ 220.24

$ 100.00

$ 250.00
$
59.21

$ 250.00
$ 54.66

$ 760.00

$ 630.00

$

$ 309.21

8:13

$ 304.66

$ 768.13

$ 630. 00

$

.00

.00

$ 103.00
$ 160.00
$ 263.00

80.00
90.00
$ 170.00

161.07

$ 154.12

$
$

73.45
68.86

$
$

175.30
57.76

$ 47.49
$ 100.00

$ 102.59
$ 100.00
$ 201.00

$

60.00

$ 293.06

Education Fees for Children
School Lunches
TOT AL CHILDREN SCHOOL COSTS

$

Health Insurance Premiums
Life Insurance Premiums
Short Term Disability,
life, child life, A&D Ins
Health Care Expenses
Health/Dental Pharmacy Expenses
TOTAL MEDICAL/DENTAL/LIFE
INSURANCE EXPENSES

$ 308.46

$ 356.71

$ 343.31

401 K Deposits
TOT AL 401 K DEPOSITS

$

$ 119.17
$ 119.17

$ 128.44

$ 346.16

$ 119.17

$ 128.44

$ 346.16

$3,424.94

$2,980.54

$3,813.90

$3,519.22

GRAND TOTALS

$

119.17
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CHRISTIANSEN, JUDGE:
,r1 Paul R. Sauer II and Pauline L. Sauer married in 1987 and separated in 2004. Paul filed
for divorce in 2013. After a bench trial, the court issued a decree of divorce in November 2015, in
which it awarded Pauline half of Paul's retirement benefits and alimony of $576 per month and
ordered Pauline to reimburse Paul approximately $1, 438 for moving expenses and utility bills.
Paul appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the evidence, by
imputing Pauline's needs, and by entering conclusions not supported by the evidence. We affirm.
,r2 Paul first contends that the trial court "abused its discretion when it stated that [he] failed
~

to meet his burden of proof when offering evidence relating to debt and property distribution." Paul
notes that the standard of proof applicable to civil actions is the preponderance of the evidence.

See Morris v. Farmers Home Mutual Ins. Co., 500 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1972). Paul then asserts
that because he "provided copious amounts of evidence in testimony and exhibits" that "went unrefuted by [Pauline]," the court abused its discretion when it determined that he had not met his
burden of proof. In essence, Paul's argument is that because he presented uncontested evidence
regarding the value of certain items, the trial court was required to find that evidence credible.
,r3 At trial, Paul entered into evidence a list of items he claimed Pauline had lost. The list
included his estimates as to the value of each item. Pauline denied losing the items and did not
vJ

present competing evidence of those items' value.
1J4 The court rejected Paul's estimates of the values of the items because he "did not testify
that he had any experience in evaluation or training in that area." But the court also found that
Paul had not demonstrated that Pauline was responsible for losing the items. Specifically, the
court explained it was troubled that, although Paul "voluntarily stored" at the homes of
acquaintances some of the items that later went missing, Paul nevertheless sought "to hold
[Pauline] responsible for the loss of all of the personal property" on the list. The court also noted
that Paul had never reported the loss of any property to law enforcement. The court ultimately
found Paul's testimony "not credible as to why he would voluntarily store his property at other
people's homes and then blame the resulting loss on [Pauline]."
,rs Thus, the record shows that the trial court considered testimony by both Paul and Pauline
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before finding that Paul had failed to demonstrate that Pauline caused the loss of the listed items.
Paul does not challenge that finding. Because the court rejected Paul's claim that Pauline was
responsible for the loss of the items, it is irrelevant whether the court correctly valued them.( 11
1f6 Paul also asserts that the court's "pattern of disbelief' regarding his testimony and the
evidence he proffered "is a clear abuse of discretion." But we give great deference to a trial court's
determinations of credibility "based on the presumption that the trial judge, having personally
observed the quality of the evidence, the tenor of the proceedings, and the demeanor of the
parties, is in a better position to perceive the subtleties at issue than we can looking only at the
cold record." See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87,

,r 20, 57 P.3d 220. Consequently, in "all actions

tried upon the facts without a jury, findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." Hale v. Big H Constr. Inc., 2012 UT App 283,

,r 9,288 P.3d 1046 (quoting Utah R. Civ.

P. 52(a) (2012)) {brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). A court may well find
that several pieces of evidence presented by a single party are not credible; such a "pattern of
disbelief' does not, standing alone, prove clear error or otherwise constitute grounds for
withdrawing the due regard we owe to the trial court. And, here, the trial court was not required to
believe Paul simply because he presented more evidence than Pauline or because Pauline did not
directly contradict his proffered testimony. See, e.g., Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Gas. Co., 583
P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978) {"The testimony of a party ... is not conclusive, even ifit is not
contradicted . ... [The party's] testimony is to be given such weight and credibility as the trier of
fact finds reasonable under the circumstances." (emphasis added)); Fullmer v. Fullmer, 2015 UT
App 60,

,r 25, 347 P.3d

14 ("Determinations regarding the weight to be given to the testimony of

witnesses, including expert witnesses, are within the province of the finder of fact, and we will not
second guess a court's decisions about evidentiary weight and credibility if there is a reasonable
basis in the record to support them." (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

1f7 Because the trial court found that Paul failed to prove that Pauline lost the items, his
complaint that the trial court improperly rejected his valuation of those items is irrelevant. Even if
the trial court had found that Pauline lost the items, Paul has failed to demonstrate that the court's
credibility determination was clearly erroneous, and the nature of appellate review would require
us to defer to that credibility determination. See id.; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(4) ("Findings of
fact ... must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses."); Dahl v. Dahl, 2015
UT 79, ,r 121 (same, in the context of a marital property distribution).
1f8 Paul next contends that the trial court "abused its discretion when it awarded alimony,
mistakenly relying on Dahl v. Dahl to reject the financial statement figures submitted by [Pauline]
and impute its own on her behalf." Specifically, Paul argues that the trial court was bound by
Pauline's testimony, or lack thereof, regarding Pauline's needs and her living expenses related to
11

her housing costs. Paul asserts that, whereas Dahl explicitly states that courts may impute figures
[only] when there is insufficient evidence," "[t]here is no lack of evidence in this case."
,rg Dahl did not hold, as Paul claims, that imputing an amount for an alimony factor is
improper whenever evidence pertaining to that factor has been presented. Rather, Dahl instructs
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~

that the court may impute a reasonable amount for an alimony factor when no credible evidence
regarding that factor has been presented. See Dahl, 2015 UT 79,

,m 115-16 (noting that "there

[was] insufficient evidence of one of the statutory alimony factors" due to a party's "failure to
~

provide credible evidence of her financial need, "and thus that the trial court could impute figures).
2
[ 1 When a party obviously underestimates (as here) or overestimates (as is more common) his or
her living expenses, the trial court is not limited to awarding either the reported amount or nothing.
Instead, the dearth of credible evidence regarding a particular claim simply renders the quantum of
evidence as to that claim insufficient.
1J10 Here, the trial court reasonably rejected Pauline's estimate of $400 per month in housing
expenses because, "[a]lthough [Pauline] lives in a trailer on a friend's property, it is unknown how
long a person can survive on the good nature of a friend. 11 [ 311n other words, the court found that

~

Pauline's estimate of her current housing expenses was not relevant to determining her
reasonable housing needs going forward.[41 This finding left the court without any specific
evidence of Pauline's housing needs that was both credible and relevant. Paul has not claimed, let
alone shown, that the finding was clearly erroneous. See Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ,J 121; see also
Anderson, 583 P.2d at 104. Once the court determined that there was no evidence that was both
credible and relevant regarding Pauline's reasonable housing needs, it was appropriate for the
court to impute a reasonable amount based on other evidence provided by the parties. See Dahl,
2015 UT 79, ,J 116. The court found that Paul's claimed housing need of $975 was reasonable
and thus that "[i]t is reasonable to impute $975 as a rental payment for [Pauline]." There was no
claim or evidence that Paul's and Pauline's reasonable housing needs differed or were wildly
different than the housing they enjoyed during their marriage. [5] We therefore see no impropriety
in the trial court's decision to impute housing needs to Pauline in the same amount as Paul had
claimed was reasonable for him.
1J11 A similar example may be found in the court's overall findings with respect to the
alimony factors. Ultimately, the court found that the evidence presented by Pauline (to the effect
that her monthly income was $189 and her monthly housing expense was $400) was not credible
relevant evidence of her reasonable earning capacity and living expenses, and it therefore
imputed figures for both her income and housing ($1, 517 and $975, respectively). Although
Pauline's financial declaration reported that her only income was $189 per month in food stamps
at the time of trial, the court took into account whether she could work and what she could
reasonably earn. Based on Paulina's prior earnings, the court imputed $1, 517 per month of
income to her. But if we were to adopt Paul's reading of Dahl- that any evidence regarding an
alimony factor precludes imputation by the court-we would be forced to conclude that the trial court
could not have imputed income to Pauline, because she presented evidence, albeit not credible
evidence, that her income was $189. Dahl, as we read it, does not require this result.
1J12 Paul also claims that Pauline "stated she was not asking for Alimony" and that "her
financial declaration indicated no need for alimony." Paul fails to provide citations to the record for
either of these assertions. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring an appellant's argument to
contain "citations to the ... parts of the record relied on"). Paul thus fails to refer us to any of the
evidence he argues should have prevented the court from imputing Pauline's financial figures. Our
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review of the parts of the record to which Paul might be referring indicates that Pauline rejected
"alimony" only until she became aware of what the word meant. Once the word was explained,
Pauline stated that, "as far as the money, I'm entitled to it. I'm entitled to something" and that "I just
want what's fair" because "I deserve it." And Paul's assertion that Pauline's financial declaration
showed no need for alimony is belied by that very declaration: according to it, Pauline was
unemployed, had no savings, received $189 per month in public assistance, and had monthly
expenses totaling $615. We therefore cannot agree with Paul that the trial court's finding that
Pauline had unmet needs was clearly erroneous.
,I13 Paul's third contention is that the trial court "abused its discretion when it made
conclusions not found in the evidence." Specifically, he asserts that the court's findings that he had
been the "sole source of family income" and that Pauline "had no access to marital funds during
the separation of the parties" are "patently false. He describes testimony by both himself and
11

Pauline, but fails to provide record citations to that testimony or to provide record citations
identifying the parts of the trial court's findings with which he takes issue. See Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9).
,I14 We will not take it upon ourselves to search the record for testimony that might support
Paul's arguments. See, e.g., Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 2014 UT App 154, ,I 6, 330 P.3d 762 ("An
appellate court should not be asked to scour the record to save an appeal by remedying the
deficiencies of an appellant's brief."). In any event, even if such testimony exists in the record, the
trial court's failure to credit it would have been within its discretion to determine the respective
credibility of the parties. See, e.g., supra ,I 6. Paul has done nothing to show that disbelieving any
such evidence would have been clearly erroneous or an abuse of the court's discretion. We
reiterate that, following a bench trial, the court's factual findings will be sustained on appeal unless
the appellant demonstrates that they are "so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence," see 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,I 69, 99 P.3d 801 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); this deference naturally extends to determinations of credibility.
1J15 We conclude that Paul has not demonstrated clear error in the trial court's findings.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Notes:
1
[ lsimilarly, the court rejected Paul's claim regarding the value of a truck. Paul claimed that the
truck was worth $1, 900 because he had received an offer to buy it for "$1, 000 solely for the
engine." He also testified that he believed Pauline had "sold it to someone." The court found that
the only evidence of the truck's value was the offer to buy it for $1, 000 and consequently fixed its
value at $1, 000. But the court then found that there was no credible evidence "as to what
happened to the truck" and therefore refused to treat it as sold. On appeal, Paul asserts that the
trial court "found [his testimony] not credible because he did not provide the [Kelley Blue Book]
valuation of the truck." However, any dispute regarding the valuation of the truck is immaterial
when the court did not find credible the claim that it had been sold.
[211n Dahl, the supreme court ultimately held that the district court's failure to impute an amount for
Ms. Dahl's needs was within its discretion. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ,I,I 116-17. While the district
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court could have imputed an amount, it was not required to do so, because it "awarded Ms. Dahl
over $1.5 million in marital property" which was "sufficiently large ... to support a comfortable

~

standard of living." Id. ,r 116.
3
[ ]This determination makes conceptual sense. In the aftermath of a separation, a party may
temporarily return to his or her parents' home, shelter with friends, or become homeless and thus
incur no actual housing expenses. This does not require a court to find that the party has no
reasonable housing expenses; rather, the court may consider what constitutes a reasonable rental
or mortgage payment in the relevant area for housing similar to the housing previously shared by

~

the parties. See Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-5(8)(e) (LexisNexis 2013) ("As a general rule, the court
should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony(.]").
4
[ lone of the purposes of alimony is to ensure that "divorcing spouses both retain sufficient assets
to avoid becoming a public charge." See Dahl, 2015 UT 79,

'xP

,r,r 25,

111. Here, Pauline's current

housing expenses were essentially subsidized through the charity of a member of the public. It
was therefore appropriate for the court to consider Pauline's reasonable unsubsidized needs
rather than her actual subsidized expenses.
5
[ ]Thus, failing to impute reasonable housing expenses for Pauline could have indicated that the
district court did not comply with its charge in fashioning an alimony award; i.e., "to enable the
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge." See Dahl, 2015 UT 79,
(emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
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